Studies on joint task performance have proposed that co-acting individuals co-represent the shared task context, which implies that actors integrate their co-actor's task components into their own task representation as if they were all their own task. This proposal has been supported by results of joint tasks in which each actor is assigned a single response where selecting a response is equivalent to selecting an actor. The present study used joint task switching, which has previously shown switch costs on trials following the actor's own trial (intrapersonal switch costs) but not on trials that followed the co-actor's trial (interpersonal switch costs), suggesting that there is no task co-representation. We examined whether interpersonal switch costs can be obtained when action selection and actor selection are confounded as in previous joint task studies. The present results confirmed this prediction, demonstrating that switch costs can occur within a single actor as well as between co-actors when there is only a single response per actor, but not when there are two responses per actor. These results indicate that task co-representation is not necessarily implied even when effects occur across co-acting individuals and that how the task is divided between co-actors plays an important role in determining whether effects occur between co-actors.
Introduction
A successful completion of a joint task requires both the division of labor between co-acting individuals and the integration of divided task components into the individuals' task representations. The integration of divided components of the task is advantageous in a joint task setting because the mutual understandings of the current states of the co-actors allow each actor to monitor what their co-actors are doing and how they are doing it. The integration would be necessary especially under a condition for which precise coordination of co-actors' actions is crucial for a successful completion of a task (e.g., pair skating or rowing a boat). In previous studies of joint performance, there have been strong emphases on the integration of divided task components into a single mental representation. The resulting representation, or the act of creating such a representation, is termed co-representation (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003) . Nevertheless, little has been said about the division of labor in a joint task. The division of labor enables each actor to concentrate on their own components of the task, while their coactors work on other parts independently (Yamaguchi, Clarke, & Egan, 2018) . It reduces workloads of individual actors, in a way that allows individual actors to complete their parts to a higher standard. In organizational contexts, the division of labor also allows individuals to be specialized in areas of their expertise (Moreland, 1999) . The division of labor and the integration of divided task components are both important factors in a joint task, but they also provide two opposing forces: the former promotes independence and autonomy of individual actors, whereas the latter facilitates collaboration and coordination between actors. The question of how these two forces operate in a joint task setting is of central importance when understanding the nature of collective behaviors. The purpose of the present study was to investigate what factors contribute to the balance between the division of labor and the integration of divided task components in a joint task setting.
In the last decade, joint task performance has been studied in various task settings that are used traditionally to investigate cognitive processes and representations underlying individuals' performance. These tasks include the Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003) , flanker task (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2014) , Stroop task (Saunders, Melcher, & van Zoest, 2018; Yamaguchi, Clarke, et al., 2018) , and task switching (Yamaguchi, Wall, & Hommel, 2017b) , among others. The
